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http://www.ece.cmu.edu/~trussAbstract—Distributed shared-memory (DSM) multi-
processors provide a scalable hardware platform, but lack
the necessary redundancy for mainframe-level reliability
and availability. Chip-level redundancy in a DSM server
faces a key challenge: the increased latency to check results
among redundant components. To address performance
overheads, we propose a checking filter that reduces the
number of checking operations impeding the critical path
of execution. Furthermore, we propose to decouple
checking operations from the coherence protocol, which
simplifies the implementation and permits reuse of existing
coherence controller hardware. Our simulation results of
commercial workloads indicate average performance
overhead is within 4% (9% maximum) of tightly coupled
DMR solutions. 
I.  INTRODUCTION
Mainframes remain key to business-critical operations that
range from transaction processing and decision support to sup-
ply-chain management and logistical operations. Unfortu-
nately, increasing levels of integration result in rising soft- and
hard-error rates for future processors [4,12]. For mainframes in
particular, the challenge becomes balancing performance
enhancements with design complexity while maintaining high
reliability, availability, and serviceability (RAS) targets. 
To mitigate increasing error rates, recent work advocates
tightly coupled checkers in the form of redundant threads
[15,24], cores [8,13], or dedicated checking logic [1,20].
Although these designs impose little performance overhead,
tightly coupled redundancy does not protect from complete
chip failure, which research predicts will occur more fre-
quently with continued device scaling [23]. 
Replicating execution across dual-modular redundant
(DMR) chips provides protection from chip-level failures [2].
Furthermore, redundant execution at the chip level reduces or
eliminates the need for complex microarchitectural changes
required by tightly coupled checkers. However, existing chip-
level redundant architectures all have significant disadvan-
tages: either they require custom, message-passing software [2]
or compromise scalability by using a small, broadcast-based
interconnect [17]. 
In contrast, hardware distributed shared-memory (DSM)
makes an ideal platform for building future mainframe servers.
DSM preserves the familiar shared-memory programming
model and provides a scalable hardware architecture. Integrat-
ing physically distributed DMR chips in a hardware DSM,
however, faces a fundamental performance challenge due to
the long latency—hundreds or thousands of processor clock
cycles—required to check execution results. 
Our prior proposal [7] for a chip-level redundant DSM
suffers from unacceptable performance overhead, particularly
in commercial workloads, due to frequent, long-latency check-
ing on the critical path of execution. Previously proposed
mechanisms [7] that reduce the latency of checking fail to pro-
vide adequate improvement and require impractical changes to
the cache coherence protocol and its implementation.
To overcome these limitations from prior work, we pro-
pose the following key mechanisms for chip-level redundancy
in a DSM server:
• Checking filter. The majority of modified cache blocks
remain on chip long after the last update to the block [11].
Because of this “dead time”, we observe that over 90% of
checking operations can be removed from the critical path of
execution. We propose a hardware mechanism called the
checking filter to determine when unnecessary checks can be
elided from the critical path. We show that a checking filter can
reduce performance overheads to within 4% on average (9%
worst case), when compared with a tightly coupled DMR sys-
tem.
• Decoupled checking protocol. We propose to decouple
error checking from the DSM coherence protocol. Unlike our
previous design [7], decoupled checking requires no modifica-
tion to the existing coherence controller. Although the check-
ing latency increases slightly with a decoupled design, the
effectiveness of the checking filter is sufficiently high that
overall performance overhead not affected.
We implement the checking filter and decoupled checking
protocol in a scalable DSM architecture, and we provide a
detailed description of the hardware design, including lockstep
coordination, error checking, and rollback-recovery operations.
Our evaluations, using cycle-accurate simulation of commer-
cial workloads, show performance overhead is within 9% of
tightly coupled redundancy..  * Now with Sun Microsystems Labs, Menlo Park, CA1
Paper Outline. In Section II we review prior work on dis-
tributed DMR in hardware DSM servers. Section III proposes
the checking filter, and Section IV describes the decoupled
checking protocol. In Section V, we present details of our sys-
tem design, which we evaluate in Section VI. We present
related work in Section VI and conclude in Section VII.
II.  BACKGROUND
DSM makes an ideal platform for future mainframes
where scalable processing and memory capacity are required
within a shared-memory programming model. Moreover, in
comparison with conventional, monolithic memory systems
(e.g., SMP), modern DSM architectures reduce the latency to
memory by integrating DRAM controllers and network inter-
face hardware directly on chip. Figure 1 illustrates a DSM
architecture built from chip multiprocessors (CMPs) with inte-
grated memory and interconnect controllers.
We apply a single-point-of-failure model for transient and
permanent faults affecting the CMPs of our system, where a
single fault (e.g., radiation strike [12] or device wearout [4,23])
may alter any number of state or logic elements of the chip,
including complete chip failure. We assume that the processor
datapath is currently unprotected, but require that information
redundancy (e.g., parity or ECC codes) protect architectural
state such as register files and caches. Furthermore, integrated
coherence and memory controllers are protected by self-check-
ing circuits [17] and/or end-to-end protocol checks [21].
Orthogonal techniques protect components outside the CMPs,
such as DRAM [5], interconnect [22], and I/O devices [14].
To mitigate faults in processor cores and caches, tradi-
tional lockstep designs [2] place pairs of redundant chips in
close physical proximity and use a common clock to drive each
pair. Each pair shares a single bus such that external inputs
(e.g., interrupts, cache line fills, etc.) arrive simultaneously in
both chips. A dedicated checker circuit compares outgoing data
before the data gets released to the outside system. 
In a distributed DMR design, however, lockstep pairs can-
not be driven with a common clock or share a single input bus.
Previous work [7] addresses these challenges by time-shifting
DMR pairs, where each ‘master’ chip operates a fixed time ref-
erence ahead of its redundant ‘slave’. To avoid coordinating
recovery with other DMR pairs or the outside system, each
DMR pair creates a lightweight checkpoint of locally modified
architectural state any time the pair interacts with the outside
system.
After receiving an external input, before creating a check-
point, a DMR pair first compares signatures of computation
results, called fingerprints [19], which efficiently detect errors
that affect retired instructions. Figure 2 illustrates the checking
operations required if the input is a request for modified archi-
tectural state, termed a dirty read request in shared-memory
systems. The master cannot reply to the request directly,
because the master cannot guarantee the requested cache block
(‘X’) is error free. Instead, the reply must wait for the master/
slave time shift (‘L’) and the subsequent fingerprint compari-
son at the slave.
Previous work [7] suffered from unacceptable perfor-
mance overheads due to the long-latency checking imposed on
dirty read operations. If the master can differentiate previously
checked cache blocks from unchecked cache blocks, the master
can reply directly to the majority of dirty read requests. In
Section III, we propose the checking filter as a mechanism to
specifically detect accesses to unchecked blocks.
Figure 2 also shows the second key shortcoming of our
previous design: integrated cache coherence and checking pro-
tocols. The master and slave coherence controllers are not
redundant as they fundamentally implement different behav-
iors. For the slave to reply to request ‘X’, it must implement a
new coherence protocol and bypass the existing protocol
implementation. 
Adding a new protocol controller for redundant execution
is impractical. Existing coherence protocol implementations
are complex, hard-to-verify structures [6]. A practical imple-
mentation of distributed DMR must therefore decouple check-
ing from coherence, as we propose in Section IV.
III.  CHECKING FILTERS
Most dirty cache blocks are updated long before an exter-
nal coherence request accesses the modified value [11]. Lever-
aging the fact that fingerprints summarize all previously retired
instructions [19], we observe that most cached values are effec-
tively checked by prior fingerprint comparisons. We propose a
checking filter, kept at each master processor core, which iden-
tifies unchecked cache blocks requested by dirty read requests
and permits the master to reply without first checking with the
slave. 
A.  Filter Operation
Conceptually, the checking filter operates as a searchable
queue, where each entry consists of addresses from globally
visible stores occurring between two fingerprints (a fingerprint
Figure 1. DSM system model. Figure 2. Checking in TRUSS [7], extended to CMPs.2
interval). Figure 3(left) illustrates the abstract operation of the
checking filter. Stores are marked with sequence numbers (e.g.,
‘S0’ is older than ‘S1’), and each row in the queue is marked
on the right with a fingerprint interval number.
The filter must support four operations: (1) a new store,
(2) a new fingerprint being sent, (3) a fingerprint acknowledge-
ment from the slave, and (4) a snoop on behalf of a dirty read
request. We examine each of these as follows:
1. When a store instruction becomes globally visible, its
cache block address is added to the most recent checking inter-
val.
2. When a new fingerprint is sent (FPsend), the filter
closes the previous checking interval and creates a new interval
in which stores (operation 1) are added. The addresses being
kept previously in the “new interval” are now part of the pend-
ing intervals.
3. When the slave acknowledges a fingerprint (FPack), the
filter removes the addresses in the oldest checking interval. 
4. When a snoop request arrives, the filter checks for the
presence of the requested cache block anywhere in the queue.
If present, the response to the dirty read request must wait for
the slave to corroborate its contents before release. If absent,
the master can reply to the request directly, thereby eliding the
long-latency check.
B.  Filter Design
Implementing the conceptual organization shown in
Figure 3(left), the checking filter requires a CAM structure
with age-based lookup, similar in complexity to a load-store
queue (LSQ) in an out-of-order processor core. We observe
that the filter only needs to indicate when a block must be
checked. False positives—where the filter incorrectly enforces
checking on a previously checked block—only suffer perfor-
mance penalty of checking. 
We propose a design based on Bloom Filters [3], which
indicate presence of an item (a cache block address) by map-
ping its key (a portion of the address) to a sequence of bits. To
avoid name conflicts with our checking filter, we refer to the
set of bits in a Bloom Filter structure as a “hash”.
Figure 3(right) illustrates the design we propose. The
block address is subdivided into a number of segments, shown
in white (the gray portions are unused). Each segment is
encoded using a one-hot encoding to create the hash output.
We keep an active hash for store addresses in the current fin-
gerprint interval. As they become visible, new stores are added
to the active hash. When a new fingerprint is sent to the slave,
the active hash is inserted in a pending hash FIFO queue. For
efficient lookup, we keep an additional aggregate hash that
consists of a logical OR of all pending hashes, including the
active hash. When a fingerprint acknowledgement arrives from
the slave, the oldest hash from the pending queue is removed
and the aggregate hash is rebuilt by logically ORing the pend-
ing hashes and active hash.
The systems we study use the Total Store Order (TSO)
memory model, which enforces program order among stores
from retirement until global visibility in the L1 cache. As in
commercial TSO designs, we use a store buffer to preserve this
order. Because the checking filter also preserves the order
among stores across fingerprint intervals, we augment the store
buffer to include a fingerprint interval counter with each entry.
We maintain a separate counter of fingerprint acknowledge-
ments from the slave. When a store drains from the store
buffer, its address is placed in the active hash if the store’s fin-
gerprint counter is greater than the last acknowledged-finger-
print counter. The counter size is bounded by twice the
maximum number of in-flight fingerprints. In practice, 64 or
fewer fingerprints ever exist at once, so 7-bit counters are suffi-
cient. 
IV.  CHECKING PROTOCOL
A.  Coupled checking
To reduce the penalty applied to coherence requests, our
prior proposal coupled the coherence protocol and checking
operations. Figure 4(left) illustrates the coupled nature of this
approach. When a dirty read request arrives at the master and
accesses an unchecked cache block, the master forwards the
request and the current fingerprint to the slave. The slave, after
reaching the same point in execution, replies to the request if
the slave’s fingerprint matches the master’s.
By sending the reply directly from the slave, coupled
checking minimizes the penalty incurred by coherence requests
when a check is required. The implementation of the coherence
protocol, however, is prohibitively complex. The master and
slave coherence controllers do not operate redundantly; there-
fore, the existing coherence controller on the slave cannot be
used. The combined protocol must be verified [6] and a new
coherence controller must implemented at the slave. The
slave’s controller must accept state updates from the master’s
Figure 3. (left) Conceptual operation of checking filters, (right) hardware implementation with Bloom Filters3
coherence controller, which inform the slave where to reply to
coherence requests. 
B.  Decoupled checking
In contrast, decoupled checking (Figure 4(right)) separates
the coherence protocol implementation from checking opera-
tions. After comparing fingerprint values, the slave responds to
the master with an acknowledgement, and the master sends any
appropriate coherence replies. The acknowledgement step
introduces an additional network hop to the checking penalty.
Although this acknowledgement exists in the coupled protocol
as well, it is not on the critical path of the reply.
The decoupled checking protocol permits the use of a
coherence protocol controller from a non-redundant design
without modification. To implement the decoupled protocol,
we introduce a new hardware structure, the checking table,
between the cache and existing coherence controller. The
checking table can be simply bypassed if the chip is not used in
a master/slave configuration (e.g., non-redundant).
The checking table is responsible for holding memory
operations that require an explicit check with the slave. When a
reply requiring a check is sent from the cache to the coherence
controller (e.g., containing the dirty cache block being
requested), the checking table will force a new fingerprint to be
sent and insert the reply into a list of stalled operations. The
stalled reply is released when an acknowledgement, tagged
with the same address, is received from the slave.
V.  LOCKSTEP COORDINATION
When the DMR modules are situated on the same spe-
cially-designed chip or motherboard, they can achieve lockstep
operation by sharing a common clock and using a common bus
to receive input stimuli in precise synchrony. However, this
direct approach to enforcing lockstep is infeasible in a distrib-
uted DMR arrangement. Instead, our solution takes an asym-
metrical approach to lockstepping where true simultaneity is
not needed. 
Instead, we opt for a time-shifted lockstep, where the pre-
cise microarchitectural behaviors are duplicated on master and
slave chips, but with a constant time delay separating them.
There are three key aspects to maintaining this time shift:
timestamps, input replication, and deterministic behaviors. 
Timestamp counters maintain a time reference for both
master and slave—the time-shift between master and slave is
measured in timestamp counter ticks. They need not be driven
by tightly synchronized physical clocks. Rather, they mark the
progress of execution on the cores of the CMP. The implemen-
tation of a timestamp counter is dependent on the specific
details of the chip design and is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Input replication ensures that both master and slave
observe identical input stimuli. In our design, input replication
is actively maintained with coordination messages, which are
illustrated in Figure 5. When the master receives an external
input, it records the current timestamp counter value and sends
both a copy of the input data and the timestamp value to the
slave. The slave, running a fixed timestamp delay behind the
master, places the coordination message in a FIFO called the
gated delivery queue. The gated delivery queue sends queued
inputs to the slave when its local timestamp matches the mes-
sage’s timestamp plus the fixed delay.
The fixed master-to-slave delay must be sufficiently long
to permit worst-case transit time of the coordination message
between the master and slave in a distributed DMR pair. To
bound worst-case transit time, we require coordination mes-
sages to travel on the highest-priority channel of the intercon-
nect (cannot be blocked by other message types of lower
priority). Messages that arrive ahead of the worst-case transit
latency are buffered in the gated delivery queue, whose size is
bounded by the maximum buffering in one network hop.
Because we replicate the payload and timing of external
inputs, we require deterministic behavior for the processor
cores and caches. Fortunately, deterministic behavior is also a
requirement for many testing approaches, including the signa-
ture-mode scan found in Intel processors [10]. Furthermore,
recent work [16] shows that deterministic behaviors is possible
on CMPs with source-synchronous messaging across multiple
clock domains.
Note that a globally synchronous clock in a distributed
system is undesirable for many reasons and not required here.
The only requirement is that the locally generated clocks at the
master and slave do not drift to the point that the lag between
Figure 4. (left) Coupled checking, (right) decoupled checking.
Figure 5. Lockstep coordination hardware.4
the master and slave is insufficient to cover the worst-case
transit latency of the coordination message. This condition can
be detected when coordination messages begin to arrive at the
slave too close to the delivery time minus some safety margin.
In these cases, frequency control mechanisms such as down-
spread spectrum modulation [9] are needed to slow down the
slave clock and rebuild the master-to-slave delay. If necessary,
large clock frequency adjustments (e.g., for thermal or power
throttling) must be explicitly prepared with software assis-
tance.
VI.  EVALUATION
We evaluate error-free performance with FLEXUS, a cycle-
accurate full-system simulator [25]. We model a DSM with 16
logical processors (16 nodes for tightly coupled DMR and 32
nodes for distributed DMR). Each node contains a speculative,
4-way out-of-order superscalar processor core and an on-chip
cache hierarchy. We chose a single-core baseline to facilitate
comparisons with previous work [7] and because the results
shown here are sensitive to scaling the number of nodes, not
cores. Other relevant system parameters are listed in Table 1. 
Our performance evaluations compare with a DSM of
tightly lockstepped DMR pairs, where each chip contains a
lockstepped checker circuit (as in [18]). We assume the lock-
stepped checker introduces no performance overhead; how-
eve r,  we  use  th i s  base l ine  so le ly  fo r  pe r fo rmance
comparison—the tightly-coupled pairs cannot tolerate node
loss. Our design doubles the number of nodes over a non-
redundant or tightly lockstepped DMR system.
Table 2 lists parameters of the workloads used in our eval-
uations. For all workloads, we use a systematic sampling
approach [25] that draws approximately 100 brief measure-
ments of 50,000 cycles each. We launch all measurements
from checkpoints with warmed caches, branch predictors, and
directory state, then run for 100,000 cycles to warm queue and
interconnect state prior to collecting statistics. We aggregate
total cycles per user instruction as CPI, which is inversely pro-
portional to overall system throughput [25]. 
A.  Baseline Performance
We evaluate the baseline performance of our workload
suite with a tightly coupled DMR system, labeled “Tight” in
Figure 6. The large fraction of time spent on dirty reads indi-
cates that previous designs (“TRUSS”) will have significant
additional stalls due to checking overheads. As expected,
Figure 6 shows that the peak overhead is 33% (DSS Query 2)
and the average overhead is 19%. 
Figure 6 also shows the optimal effectiveness of the
checking filter and the impact from decoupled checking,
labeled “Filt+DC”. We simulated an oracle filter implementa-
tion that produces no false positives—all checking stalls are
due to true data races in the programs. The decoupled checking
imposes an additional network hop on all checked operations.
In our model, the additional network hop results in a 7%
increase in latency on dirty reads.
Processing Cores UltraSPARC III ISA
4 GHz 8-stage pipeline; out-of-order
4-wide dispatch / retirement
256-entry ROB; 64-entry store buffer
L1 Caches Split I/D, 64KB 2-way, 2-cycle load-to-use
4 ports, 32 MSHRs
L2 Cache Unified, 8MB 8-way, 25-cycle hit latency
1 port, 32 MSHRs
Main Memory 60 ns access latency
64 banks per node
64-byte coherence unit
Protocol Controller 1 GHz microcoded controller
64 transaction contexts
Interconnect 4x4 2D torus (baseline), 4x4x2 3D torus
25 ns latency per hop
128 GB/s peak bisection bandwidth
TABLE 1. DSM SERVER CONFIGURATION.
Online Transaction Processing (TPC-C)
Oracle 100 warehouses (10 GB), 16 clients, 1.4 GB SGA
DB2  100 warehouses (10 GB), 64 clients, 450 MB buffer pool
Web Server
Apache 16K connections, FastCGI, worker threading model
Zeus 16K connections, FastCGI
Decision Support (TPC-H on DB2)
Qry 2 Join-dominated, 450 MB buffer pool
Qry 6 Scan-dominated, 450 MB buffer pool 
Qry 17 Balanced scan-join, 450 MB buffer pool
TABLE 2. WORKLOAD CONFIGURATIONS.
Figure 6. Baseline time breakdowns.
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The filter successfully removes the most significant per-
formance overheads, reducing the average overhead to 4%
(peak 9% in OLTP DB2). The two workloads where the filter is
least effective are OLTP DB2 and DSS Query 6. We observed
that these applications have the most contention for shared data
(e.g., races). Moreover, the heavily contended cache blocks in
these workloads have latencies in the Tight model that are an
order of magnitude higher than the mean request latency
(10,000 cycles versus 1200 cycles). This result is indicative of
workloads that would benefit from additional tuning; with
reduced contention, the effectiveness of the filter will increase
and stalls will be further eliminated.
B.  Checking Filter
We evaluate the checking filter by first investigating the
rate of false positives in a practical implementation. Figure 7
shows two graphs that vary the filter’s hash design with respect
to segment size and address coverage (number of segments).
Both graphs show the fraction of dirty reads that require check-
ing; hence, lower is better (no filter corresponds to 100%
checked). Furthermore, the best coverage (lowest percentage
of checked snoops) obtained in both graphs corresponds to the
oracle filter results used in Figure 6.
In Figure 7(left), we examine sensitivity to hash segment
size. In this graph, we vary the size and number of segments to
keep the total address coverage at 32 bits. The segment size has
a first-order effect on aliasing in the hash—smaller segments
result in more collisions and hence increased false positives.
With four bits per segment, the fraction of snoops requiring a
check is within 1% of optimal. Going below four bits has an
adverse effect on performance.
In Figure 7(right), we show the complementary result by
examining sensitivity to the address coverage. We keep the
number of bits per segment fixed at four and vary the number
of segments to change the address coverage. With fewer than
32 bits, and particularly with just 8 bits, the aliasing increases
to unacceptable levels. 
To measure the peak number of in-flight fingerprints, and
hence the number of pending hashes required, we varied the
rate of periodic fingerprinting. to examine the peak number of
in-flight fingerprints, and hence the largest number of pending
hashes required. Figure 8 shows that in all cases, no more than
64 pending fingerprints were required. For the workloads we
study, total storage for the filter is 1 kB, most of which is kept
in a FIFO that does not require fast access.
C.  Decoupled Checking
We examine the performance overhead from decoupled
checking in Figure 9. This graph shows four experiments: NC
models the TRUSS system [7], where no filter is used and
checking is coupled to the coherence protocol; ND models
decoupled checking without a filter; FC models a system with
a filter and coupled checking; finally, FD models both mecha-
nisms proposed here—the checking filter with decoupled
checking.
The key result is that the filter effectively removes any
sensitivity to the choice of checking protocol. In DSS work-
loads this is particularly evident. Without a filter, the decou-
pled protocol adds 5% additional performance overhead;
however, with the filter, both coupled and decoupled protocols
are under 4% overhead, on average. These results show that the
performance impact of decoupled checking is negligible, if the
checking filter is used.
Figure 7. Filter implementation alternatives: (left) hash segment size; (right) address coverage with 4 bit segments.
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VII.  CONCLUSIONS
To address performance overheads in previous chip-level
redundant DSMs, we proposed a checking filter that reduces
the number of checking operations impeding the critical path
of execution. Furthmore, we propose to decouple checking
operations from the coherence protocol, which simplifies the
implementation and permits reuse of existing coherence con-
troller hardware. Our simulation results of commercial work-
loads show average performance overhead is within 4% (9%
maximum) of tightly coupled DMR solutions. 
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